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TAGS: [PREL](#) [KCFE](#) [MARR](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: CFE: MORE ON BALUYEVSKIY'S EXPANDED FLANK REGIME
PROPOSAL

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell

¶1. (C) Sergey Federyakov, Counselor in the MFA's Office of Disarmament and Security Affairs, provided some details to us on the proposal to expand Russia's flank area under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) floated by former Chief of the General Staff Baluyevskiy after the May 15 Nato-Russia Council (NRC) meeting in Brussels. Federyakov said the idea had been prompted by the U.S. and other NATO CFE countries' insistence that if the flank regime were to be eliminated for Russia, as Moscow proposes, then it would need to be eliminated as to all other CFE members also. Federyakov said Russia had taken into account U.S. and NATO members' concerns that this could lead to an arms race among the flank countries, especially in the Caucasus.

¶2. (C) Federyakov said the idea was a joint MOD-MFA proposal, but did not yet have full GOF approval. The idea would be to extend Russia's flank territory to all of "European Russia" (i.e. west of the Urals). Thus, Russia would have the same status as Turkey, Greece, Norway and other flank countries. In practical terms, this would allow Russia the freedom of movement and stationing of forces it needed to address internal security issues, and deal with new threats such as terrorism. He hastened to reassure us that Russia did not currently see a need to move new forces into the flank area, and noted that in the six months of Russia's suspension of CFE, it had not made any significant changes to its deployments.

¶3. (C) Russia would maintain the current general ceilings of 6350 tanks, 11280 ACV's, and 6315 artillery pieces (Federyakov noted that Russia was already below these limits), but its right to make extraordinary temporary deployments would be reduced to the limits of the basic temporary deployments. Thus, it would go from the current right to deploy 459 tanks, 723 ACV's and 420 artillery pieces to 153 tanks, 241 ACV's and 140 artillery pieces.

¶4. (C) Federyakov also said that while Russia currently could ask for quotas from other countries, under the new proposal Russia would be deprived of the right to ask for quotas or parts of quotas. He added that Russia was also willing to consider transparency measures, such as inspections, as foreseen in the Adapted CFE Treaty.

¶5. (C) We asked how extending the flank regime to all of western Russia would differ from simply eliminating the flank regime for Russia, since under the new proposal Russia would be allowed, for instance, to move all 6350 tanks anywhere, including into the current flank area, instead of the 1300 tanks currently allowed. Federyakov said the new proposal would maintain overall ceilings, would decrease Russia's extraordinary deployment capabilities and eliminate Russia's

right to receive quotas, and would prevent the arms race the west feared.

Other Outstanding Issues

¶6. (C) Federyakov said the GOR wanted to hold more frequent expert-level talks on each of the remaining issues in the parallel actions package, particularly the definition of substantial combat forces, while reiterating the mantra that the GOR did not consider Moldova and Georgia issues connected with CFE. We repeated our concerns about Russia's insistence on collective ceilings for NATO countries, and Federyakov responded they would "think about creative ways of dealing with the issue." While expressing appreciation for the talks held between A/S Fried and DVBR Director Antonov, he said the GOR felt "two meetings in six months" was not enough. We pointed out that A/S Fried had offered to meet Antonov in Oslo, but the GOR had declined. Federyakov added that it would be "difficult" for Antonov to talk about Georgia in his July 29 meeting with A/S Fried in New York.

Medvedev to Discuss with EU?

¶7. (C) European embassy colleagues told us they had heard that the MFA had been tasked to provide the Presidency with points on CFE and the flank proposal for President Medvedev's Summit with the EU this week. Federyakov declined to speculate whether Medvedev would raise the issue with the troika. Media reported that the EU representatives had been "very interested" in hearing more about Medvedev's proposal

for a new European Security Treaty during the Russia-EU Summit kick-off dinner June 26. When asked whether and how CFE would fit into such a proposal, Federyakov said the details of the proposal were still being worked out.
RUSSELL